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Abstract: Can Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) help address the needs of millions of low-income families in Mexico for housing improvement loans? The
paper assesses whether MFIs are suited to providing housing improvement
credits and evaluates whether diversified housing portfolios can improve performance and mitigate risks for these institutions. After showing that the
microfinance industry is at a nascent stage in Mexico, and that the current supply of housing microfinance credits is a tiny fraction of the estimated demand
for these loans, the paper provides suggestions for government and donors to
serve as short-term catalysts for the expansion of MFIs in the housing field.
Recommendations include support for market studies to assess the characteristics of demand and to develop attractive housing microfinance products, providing incentives to help MFIs develop new or scale up existing housing
portfolios, offering innovative sources of funds for housing microfinance, and
encouraging franchising and joint ventures between various institutions
involved in this field.

I

n the last decade, microfinance has proven to be a growing
industry in many developing countries, with the leading
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) increasing their markets
and becoming financially sustainable organizations. Despite
clear indications of a large unserved demand for productive
loans, MFIs often lack competition from commercial banks
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and other financial institutions in the low-income market segment. As a consequence, MFIs have mainly grown “horizontally,” by offering the same products to new customers, rather
than deepening the microfinance market by providing a range
of diverse products. As the industry develops, many clients
have become dissatisfied with the inflexibility of existing MFI
products to meet their diverse needs, such as financing for
insurance, healthcare, house construction, or home improvement. The inadequacy of current products is the main reason
for relatively high levels of MFI client dropouts in various
countries, 1 representing a high cost to the MFIs, which could
be reduced through careful portfolio diversification (Wilson,
2001; Wright, 2001).
The objective of this paper is to illustrate the challenges
and potential benefits for MFIs interested in diversifying into
the housing microfinance field. The paper focuses on the
Mexican case, because the demand for housing improvement
loans is very large, government housing programs have often
proven inefficient and ineffective, and MFIs lag behind in
exploiting the opportunities of this new market. 2
For this discussion, housing microfinance loans are defined
as progressive loans provided to the economically active poor
to finance (1) minor improvements, such as carpentry, plastering and painting, and the installation of doors, windows, and
security bars; (2) major improvements, such as major repairs,
the replacement of walls, floors, roofs, and sanitary fixtures, or
retrofitting homes with hurricane-resistant technology; (3)
expansions, such as the addition of a bathroom, kitchen, or living space; and (4) the creation of formal work spaces, such as
sewing rooms or carpentry workshops, for home-based productive enterprises.
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America and Caribbean Region Private Sector Development Department. Email:
mgoldberg@worldbank.org
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While a considerable percentage of houses in Mexico need
improvement (an estimated 76%, most of which belong to middle and low income people, according to the Harvard Joint
Center (2000)) the poorly developed Mexican MFI sector has
conducted a small number of unlinked urban pilots in the field
of housing. The striking mismatch between demand and supply in this country is mainly due to (1) MFIs’ lack of information on demand (i.e., geographic areas where houses are most
in need of improvement and low income households’ willingness and ability to pay for housing loans); (2) MFIs’ inexperience in this field (i.e., lack of experience with housing
microfinance loans and a lack of technical assistance); and
(3) the unavailability of medium- to long-term, commercially
priced credit lines providing MFIs with reliable funding to
expand operations in the housing microfinance field.
This paper will show that (1) the demand for commercially
priced housing improvement is enormous in Mexico, (2) the
housing improvement loan is more like a microfinance product
than a traditional mortgage loan, (3) lessons can be drawn from
initial experiences in Latin America, and (4) there are a some
local pilots upon which to build. The paper concludes with
recommendations on how to support Mexican MFIs that want
to diversify their portfolios to include housing improvement
loans.

The Demand for Housing Improvement Loans in
Mexico
In Mexico, as in most developing countries, low income households usually prefer to improve and expand their current
homes rather than purchase new units. Low and moderate
income households often acquire lots in informal subdivisions
and then construct temporary dwellings to vouchsafe the properties (Ferguson & Heider, 2000). After the buyers of the land
have built small structures on the lots, they slowly improve
and expand the houses, possibly adding a separate kitchen, an
improved bathroom, or an extra bedroom. To finance
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improvements and expansions, they usually rely on their own
funds, borrow money from their acquaintances, 3 or try to get
loans from financial institutions. Often, funds are required
from more than one of these sources to reach the target
amount needed for a given stage of home improvement.
Recent studies show that the scale of demand for housing
improvement in Mexico is substantial (Herbert & Pickering,
1997; Harvard Joint Center, 2000). Contrary to general belief,
low income households are willing to spend a high percentage
of their incomes to improve and expand their houses (World
Bank & Capital Advisors, 1998). Based on a survey conducted
in 1990 by the Mexican Census, the Harvard Joint Center for
Housing Studies (2000) estimated that approximately 12.2 million of the total 16.1 million houses in Mexico (equivalent to
76% of the 1990 housing stock) needed improvements. 4
Between 1990 and 1994, about 800,000 improvement loans
were made, meeting only 7% of the estimated total market. Of
the 12.2 million units in need of improvements in 1990:
• 2.7 million units (22% of the housing stock in need of
improvement) needed replacement or significant upgrading.
A large majority of these homes lacked almost all basic services, were made from nondurable materials, and provided
limited living space for the families dwelling in them (one or
two rooms for an average family of 5 people).
• 3.5 million homes (29% of the housing stock in need of
improvement) needed moderate upgrades. These houses generally had floors made from durable materials and had access
to electricity and gas for cooking. However, most had deficiencies, such as walls made of nondurable materials, and
lacked a bathroom or a kitchen.
• 6 million housing units (49% of the housing stock in need of
improvement) required minor changes. These houses were
generally constructed from durable materials, had access to
electricity and sewerage, and had kitchens and bathrooms.
The most frequent problems were crowding, a lack of water
in the unit, or roofs made from less durable materials.
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While rural areas needed more housing replacement, urban
areas mainly needed moderate and minor upgrading: of the 2.7
million houses deemed to need replacement or significant
upgrading, 0.7 million were in urban areas, representing 5% of
all urban units. Of the 3.5 million houses in need of moderate
upgrading, 2 million were in urban areas, representing 24% of
all urban units. Finally, of the 6 million houses in need of
minor improvements, 4.5 million were in urban areas, representing 31% of all urban units. (See Figure 1.) While government institutions often provide loans and grants to low income
communities for house building, replacement, or significant
upgrading, they do not provide support for moderate and
minor upgrading. Thus, the potential for private institutions
interested in entering the housing improvement market in
Mexico is significant, especially in urban areas.

Figure 1. Estimates of Housing Replacement and
Upgrading Needs (1990)
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In 1997, the World Bank and Capital Advisors conducted a
study on the willingness and ability of low income households
to pay for housing improvement loans in three cities located at
the border with the United States (Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and
Matamoros). The study concluded that 14% of the low income
households in need of home improvements in these three cities
were willing to take out loans and could qualify for them. The
value of the untapped market for housing improvement loans
in these areas was about $122 million (98,000 low income
households with an average housing loan of about $1,250).
If we extend the findings of the studies by Harvard
University (2000) and by the World Bank and Capital Advisors
(1998) to the country as a whole, by assuming that 14% of the
9.5 million households in need of moderate or minor improvements are willing to take on and qualify for a loan, we can conclude that there is a market for housing improvement loans of
about $1.6 billion (1.3 million households ready to take out a
home improvement loan of $1,250).
While these are rough estimates, they demonstrate that
there is significant market potential for private institutions
interested in providing housing improvement loans in Mexico,
especially in large cities. More detailed market research is necessary to assess (1) which states and cities are the most promising, (2) low income households’ willingness to take on housing
loans in these cities and states, and (3) the percentage of these
households that would qualify for a loan.

Mortgage or Microfinance?
To verify whether MFIs are suited to providing housing
improvement credits, it is important to analyze the characteristics of these loans and to compare them with the characteristics of enterprise loans, which represent the core of MFIs’
portfolios.
If housing improvement loans are small ($1,500 to $2,000)
and have short-term ranges (1 to 2 years), MFIs may be the
ideal suppliers. On the other hand, if housing improvement
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Volume 5 Number 1

Microfinance for Housing

loans are relatively large ($5,000 to $10,000) and long-term (5
to 10 years), mortgage institutions, such as commercial banks,
limited purpose mortgage banks, and credit unions, may be the
best providers. 5
Based on the experiences of a number of MFIs and other
organizations that have pioneered housing microfinance loans,
these credits appear to have the following characteristics
(Harvard Joint Center, 2000):
• Loan structure: amounts ranging from $250 to $5,000, maturities ranging from 3 months to 3 years, and interest rates
substantially higher than the prime rate
• Underwriting requirements: personal guarantees with one or
two cosigners (some loans also require periodic savings and
group liability)
• Collateral requirements: paralegal titles or simple proof of
ownership (e.g., the inhabitants of the village testifying that
the borrower lives in the house), although some institutions
require full legal title
• Technical assistance: for example, advice on construction,
building materials, and costs.
Table 1 summarizes and compares the characteristics of
housing microfinance, microenterprise loans and mortgage
loans. The main findings of this comparison are
• While mortgage finance loans are directed to middle and
upper income households, both microenterprise and housing
microfinance loans, are directed to moderate and low income
households
• The amounts and maturities of housing microfinance credits
are usually significantly lower than those of mortgage loans
and slightly higher than those of microenterprise loans
• The interest rates of housing microfinance loans are usually
closer to those of microbusiness loans than to those of mortgage loans
• Housing microfinance loans and microenterprise loans
require flexible, small collateral, while mortgage loans usually require full lien on property and legal ownership title
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Table 1. Loan Comparison

Minimal

Building of relationship with individual
borrower or with solidarity group,
which commits to guarantee repayment of loans to its individual members

Savings is often as important as loans

Prime rate plus a large margin
Available goods, personal guarantees

$50-$1,000
Under 1 year

For microenterprise, but also for
emergency expenditures

Credit unions and NGOs
traditionally; regulated finanial
institutions increasingly; also
equipment suppliers

Low and moderate income households

Microenterprise finance

Technical assistance is often required

Evaluation of current income, borrower
household income, building plans,
and cost estimates

No standard

No standard
Para-legal liens on property

$250 to $5,000
Usually under 3 years

Home improvement; some new
construction

Credit unions and NGOs
traditionally; also building
suppliers and subdividers

Low and moderate income households

Housing microenterprise

Microfinance for Housing

In light of their characteristics, especially their amounts,
interest rates, and collateral, housing microfinance loans
appear more similar to microenterprise loans than to mortgage
loans. In addition, traditional mortgage lenders find low
income households unattractive clients because they consider
them too risky and not sufficiently profitable. On the other
hand, MFIs are used to dealing with low income clients. They
have developed specific lending methodologies to reduce the
risk of low repayment rates; they have gathered information
on their customers’ credit histories and are able to select the
ones that are best suited to receive larger, longer term loans,
such as housing improvement credits, without endangering the
quality of their portfolios. For these reasons, MFIs seem to be
better positioned than mortgage institutions to satisfy the
needs of low income clients in the housing improvement field.

Lessons from International Experiences
Both in Latin America and in other regions around the world,
the performance of the leading MFIs have been increasingly
impressive in recent years in terms of the scale of operations,
profitability (after adjusting for the effects of subsidies),
and financial soundness. Latin American MFIs that have
achieved significant results include BancoSol, FIE, Caja de Los
Andes, and Crecer in Bolivia; Compartamos in Mexico;
Genesis Empresarial and the SIFFE Credit Unions in
Guatemala; Banco Ademi and ADOPEM in the Dominican
Republic; Financiera Calpia in El Salvador; and Caja Social in
Colombia. Many MFIs have proven themselves to be sound
financial institutions, capable of expanding into new markets
and developing new products for their target clientele (statistical proof of outreach, profitability, and soundness is found in
Microbanking Bulletin Tables, 2001).
By adding housing improvement loans to their product
lines, MFIs could (1) increase the scale of operations and profitability, (2) reduce client drop-out rates and the covariance
risk of the overall portfolio (housing loans tend to outperform
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other loans), (3) provide additional repayment incentives and
resources to proven clients, and (4) gain access to special
affordable government funds (both short- and long-term) that
are earmarked for housing purposes. These represent a very
powerful set of incentives to MFIs.
Two key questions arise as one considers the path from a
microfinance industry centered around one core product line
to an industry offering diversified services. First, what would
it take (in terms of incentives, market information, credit support, initial risk sharing mechanisms, and other support) for
the microfinance industry to move beyond limited product
lines of working capital and develop housing microfinance
products that could be attractive to millions of potential
clients? Second, how can sound MFIs build the institutional
capacity and systems required to develop a housing microfinance pilot and eventually full-scale operations, and what
role might the government and donors play in developing such
capacity?
To answer these questions for Mexican MFIs, it is useful to
turn to experienced, successful Latin American MFIs that have
already introduced housing microfinance and to understand
the path they took to develop this new field. Two Latin
American MFIs that have successfully added housing microfinance products to their existing portfolio are Financiera
Calpia (El Salvador) and Genesis Empresarial (Guatemala).
While the housing portfolios of these institutions are small
(Calpia had a portfolio of 1,450 loans in the year 2000, and
Genesis had only 330 active loans), their results to date have
been very encouraging (Ferguson & Heider, 2000; W. Kurup &
A de Rizz, personal communication, 2000). Both institutions
have found that housing microfinance loans have increased
their markets and improved client satisfaction, while lowering
their portfolio risk through diversification. Both plan to
expand their housing portfolios significantly in the coming
years.
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The key to successful diversification in both cases has been
a gradual process of (1) ensuring the soundness of the institution
with standard products before launching a new product (both
MFIs had reached financial sustainability before introducing
housing microfinance products), (2) conducting detailed market
analysis to quantify demand and identify key product characteristics, (3) introducing housing credit through carefully monitored pilot project, (4) providing technical assistance to clients,
and (5) scaling up housing microfinance products only after
client performance and cost management warrant it. The lending methodology does not appear to be a key issue for housing
microfinance, as both individual and group methodologies can
be successful, provided that the methodology matches the needs
and preferences of the selected target market (Ferguson &
Heider, 2000; Kururp & de Rizzo, 2001; Bonilla, 2000).

Microfinance in Mexico: A Nascent Industry
As in most large Latin American countries, the microfinance
industry in Mexico is still at a nascent stage. While the MFI
industry has grown impressively in smaller Latin American
countries (Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras), the
national industries have not developed in large Latin American
countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela), where
huge pools of microbusiness clients have little or no access to
financial services. This may be due to the lack of credible MFIs
in large markets, or to the fact that barriers to entry for a dedicated microfinance banking institution are so high in these
large markets that such institutions prove impractical
(Christen, 2000).
In Mexico, there is one large and successful MFI
(Compartamos), some innovative smaller institutions (such as
FINCOMUN and CAME), and many small-scale MFIs with
socially motivated approaches. In rural areas, there are dozens
of village banks (Cajas Populares, the most well known being
Caja Popular Mexicana), which have historically been mediocre
performers and were, until recently, unsupervised and unregulated. Most Mexican commercial banks are not interested in
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microbusinesses and low income households as clients, because
of their lack of credit history, little physical collateral, irregular cash flow, and the high transaction costs involved in serving small clients. Table 2 presents a summary of the
performance of the key Mexican MFIs, together with Caja
Popular Mexicana. As shown in Table 2, the number of clients
served by MFIs and by Caja Popular is very low: about 560,000
for a total amount lent of $738 million in the year 2000. While
the table does not include all MFIs operating in Mexico, we can
assume that it provides a good approximation of the current
offer of microfinance credits. The demand for micro and small
business productive loans in Mexico was estimated to be about
$5.1 billion (Ashby, 2000). Thus, the current supply covers
only about 14% of the potential market. It is also important to
note that the supply is highly concentrated: CPM serves 84%
of the total active clients, Compartamos 11%, and all other
institutions less than 2%. These figures clearly indicate that the
Mexican microfinance industry is underdeveloped. The key
constraints to growth mentioned by existing Mexican MFIs
during a recent survey are (1) the lack of well-trained loan
officers, coupled with high staff turnover resulting in high
training costs, (2) the lack of adequate software systems;
(3) regulatory constraints; (4) high transaction costs for small
loan amounts, (5) the current decline of the Mexican economy;
and (6) the lack of sound judicial protection against client loan
default (Enterprising Solutions, 2002). MFIs and regulatory
authorities need to address these constraints to move towards
a more mature stage of development, cover a larger share of
the market, and venture into new products, such as housing
microfinance.
Besides being the most successful Mexican MFI in terms
of scale of operation and profitability, Compartamos is
trying to address these constraints in innovative ways, serving
as an interesting example for other local MFIs interested
in increasing their market and improving their performance.
Compartamos’s most recent plans and actions include
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Average loan size
disbursed ($US)
64,100
10,500
8,975
2,600
551
400
124
488,310

No. of active
clients
0.56
3.0
<1
33
4.1
18
0
14

PAR>30
days (%)
>100%
>100%
88%
N/A
N/A
>N/A
>100%
>100%

Operating
sustainability
>100%
>95%
N/A
N/A
N/A
<N/A
<100%
>100%

Financial
sustainability

Sources: Report for World Bank by consultant Lorna Grace (2000); interviews with Mexican MFIs.
* PAR is for microfinance portfolio only. This is the average first-time loan, rather than average loan.
** December, 2000 data for Compartamos.
*** Includes mainstream operations as well as microfinance operations
+ PAR 90 days
++CPM (Caja Popular Mexicana) figures include a large number of savers who do not have an outstanding loan. Data from 2000.
While the average loan size figure is not available, 40% of CPM’s active borrowers have annual income less that US$2,975. PAR is 90
days for CPM.

Compartamos**
240
Fincomun*
800
CAME
200
FOCOMI+
1,443
Emprendedores
880
Dignidad
500
UCME***
400
Caja Popular Mexican N/A

MFIs

Table 2. Leading Mexican Microfinance Institutions (2000)*

Journal of Microfinance

portfolio diversification, an increase in the number of sources
of capital, a reduction of operating costs, and a strong focus on
internal training of its personnel.

Mexican Pilots in Housing Microfinance
While the microfinance industry is nascent in Mexico, and
microfinance for housing is even less developed, there are a few
Mexican institutions that are operating in this field, including
(1) FUNHAVI, a small-scale lender in the northern border
town of Ciudad Juarez; (2) the Caja Popular Mexicana (CPM);
and (3) FINCOMUN. (Private building contractors, material
suppliers, or land developers could represent additional channels of financing for home improvement loans but were outside the scope of this research.)
Among the interviewed institutions, FINCOMUN is the
only MFI. Caja Popular is a national savings and loan system
with over 300 branches (cajas), while FUNHAVI is an NGO
specializing in the housing field. All three institutions have
developed microfinance initiatives in response to Mexico’s
pressing need for housing microfinance, but they do not satisfy
even a small part of the existing demand for these loans. In
2001, FINCOMUN and FUNHAVI offered a total of about
1,500 housing microfinance credits, a tiny fraction of an estimated demand of more than 1 million loans for moderate and
minor improvements. Despite having a bigger housing portfolio, CPM has also been unable to meet the housing improvement needs of the country. Given that CPM has been
operating in the housing field for more than fifty years and has
had a specialized housing branch for ten years, the scale of its
housing loan portfolio is not impressive.
The three institutions face different constraints on increasing their offers in the housing field. FINCOMUN’s and
FUNHAVI’s key contraints, which are representative of the
constraints faced by most MFIs and small institutions, are (1)
limited access to affordable long-term sources of funds, (2) the
lack of a decentralized branch structure throughout the
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country or in states most in need of housing improvement,
(3) the lack of grants to support market research to design
attractive loan products for their potential clients, and (4) the
lack of information on best practices in this field from within
Mexico and other institutions throughout Latin America.
On the other hand, CPM’s key constraints to growing in
the housing field are (1) an excess of branches, some of which
are unprofitable and should be closed; (2) high portfolio risk,
which should be reduced to ensure that the institution is sound
before broadening its offer in new areas; and (3) the lack of
technical assistance to provide its clients with specific complementary services in the housing field.

FUNHAVI 9
FUNHAVI was established in 1996 to address the housing and
infrastructure needs of the tens of thousands of people moving
to Cuidad Juarez to seek work in the expanding maquiladora
(assembly) sector. As of 2001, FUNHAVI had 1,100 active
clients and an outstanding portfolio of $1.6 million. Its portfolio performance is very strong, with an on-time repayment
rate of 97%.
The Cooperative Housing Foundation Mexico (CHF) set
up FUNHAVI to ensure that private sector expansion benefited the city as a whole. CHF’s initiative—which began as a
pilot to support community banks and provide health services
to the maquiladoras—was funded with US$1 million in program assistance from the Ford Foundation, US$324,000 in
grants from leading maquiladoras (e.g., Cummins Engine
Foundation or Johnson & Johnson), and US$300,000 from the
Inter-America Foundation. As the need for housing microfinance became more pressing, CHF expanded its program to
include a full-scale housing microfinance program supporting
projects such as adding a bathroom or a kitchen, improving
water and electricity connections, and installing a new roof.
FUNHAVI’s housing loans range from US$510 to US$2,590,
with an average loan size of about US$1,550. The interest rate
is 2.5% a month, calculated on the original loan amount, and
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FUNHAVI adds a 2% upfront commission, for an effective
interest rate of 54% per year, in line with other microfinance
institutions in Mexico. The terms of the loans are between 6
and 36 months. A cosignature is required as guarantee.
The keys to FUNHAVI’s success have been (1) a simple,
streamlined, three-step review process that includes the necessary safeguards to minimize credit diversion and the misuse of
funds, (2) the integration of technical assistance, and (3) the
innovative use of partners, such as CHF and private local
companies.
The loan preparation process, from first contact to the
issuance of the loan, lasts no more than 15 days. Households
must be able to demonstrate a monthly income of two to eight
times the minimum wage (the equivalent of US$250 to
US$900). No savings or credit history is required, but the
client must be able to show recent pay stubs, provide the name
of a guarantor, and offer proof of land (which is a less stringent
requirement than formal land title). In addition, the community where the house is located must be stable; i.e., it cannot
consist solely of newly arrived maquiladoras. It also cannot be
close to a river, flood plain, or area subject to intensive
erosion.
Technical assistance consists, first, of a 30-minute educational presentation to ensure that potential clients understand
their rights and responsibilities under the program, as well as
basic information about suppliers and budgets. This session
provides key information on the characteristics of the loan
(e.g., amount and collateral required). The second step is a visit
by an architect, who reviews the construction plans and provides the budget for materials and labor. He or she charges a
fee of $22, the only charge in the loan preparation process.
More than 70% of the households that attend the presentation
invite the architect to visit their home and prepare an improvement plan and a budget for them. There are virtually no
dropouts after this stage.
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CHF Mexico has played a decisive role in the program. It
provides technical assistance and capital to FUNHAVI and
monitors its portfolio on an ongoing basis. CHF has also covered FUNHAVI’s operating deficit, which has decreased
sharply since the institution was founded.
The private sector has also played a decisive role in program expansion and streamlining. Cementos Chihuahua offers
FUNHAVI quantity discounts on cement purchases, and all
suppliers guarantee prices at the time of loan disbursement for
the life of the loan. The ESMART grocery store chain provides
access to 400 cash registers at its 19 area stores on a 24-hour
basis, so that FUNHAVI clients can make loan installment
payments. This shifts the burden of transactions and payment
security from FUNHAVI to the ESMART chain. The architects who provide budgets and plans are also small-scale
builders and work for FUNHAVI for a small honorarium.
FUNHAVI’s future plans are to expand to other border
cities, such as Tijuana, that also have a strong maquiladora sector and face a severe housing shortage, or to other attractive
markets, such as Mexico City and Chihuahua. FUNHAVI is
also planning to franchise its methodology to or partner with
sound Mexican microfinance institutions.

Caja Popular Mexicana 10
CPM is a traditional savings and loan system that covers 80
cities and surrounding rural areas in 18 states. It is a much
larger operation than FUNHAVI and has a more diversified
loan portfolio valued at US$288 million at the end of 2001
(Caja Popular Mexicana, 2002), with an estimated 30% (about
$86 million) dedicated to progressive housing. Through its
cajas, it has been providing loans for housing construction and
improvement for more than 50 years, but only in the past ten
years have these loans been treated as a distinct, progressive
housing product. CPM management is aware of an enormous
demand for progressive housing loans, as well as for new construction loans, in all the markets it serves, but the demand far
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outstrips CPM’s ability to deliver such services under current
regulations governing savings-based financial institutions.
CPM’s home improvement loans range from US$200 to
$15,500, and new home construction loans from US$5,200 to
$31,000. The loan amounts cannot exceed 40% of the borrower’s earnings. Regulations limit the loan maturity to five
years. Average loan maturity is 18 months, which indicates a
preference for home improvement loans, and interest rates
range from 1 to 2% per month.
To qualify for a loan, a household must be able to show
proof of an income level of three to seven times the minimum
wage and savings with CPM equal to 25% of the value of the
loan. A guarantor is required to cosign. CPM requires much
more time than FUNHAVI to review a loan application and
does not provide borrowers with technical assistance for contracting or construction.
Although CPM’s overall portfolio is weak by international
standards, with a portfolio at risk (PAR 30 days or less) of
about 17%, housing loans have outperformed the rest of the
portfolio, with a risk level of 8%.
To improve its portfolio performance, CPM has begun to
identify its weakest cajas and may close them, while establishing new ones in more receptive markets. Housing is likely to
remain an important part of its portfolio, given the high
demand and superior performance of this product line. CPM
has expressed its intention to expand the housing microfinance
program in Zacatecas, León, Morelos, Guadalajara, and Oaxaca
over the next few years. Changes in financial sector regulations
that provide a clear legal framework for savings-based financial
institutions could facilitate the implementation of CPM’s plan
by allowing them to borrow from government credit lines
intended to support housing construction and improvement.
Some key steps for CPM to grow successfully in this area
include closing underperforming branches, restructuring its
portfolio, and providing technical assistance to clients in the
housing field.
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FINCOMUN 11
FINCOMUN is a successful Mexican MFI with 17,200 clients
in low income Mexico City neighborhoods, an outstanding
loan portfolio of over US$3 million, and good portfolio quality (PAR 30 days at 4.3%). FINCOMUN is supervised by
Comision Bancaria Nacional y de Valores and is legally
permitted to mobilize savings from its members.
FINCOMUN has recently experimented with home
improvement loans, providing 500 loans to clients who have
repaid enterprise loans promptly. These clients were selected
on the basis of demonstrated cash flow generated by their
microbusinesses and, in most cases, because their business was
physically located in their house. Housing microfinance loans
are seen by FINCOMUN management as an extension of
enterprise loans and can be provided to clients who have outstanding enterprise loans from FINCOMUN. Housing loans
range from US$500 to US$1,000, with weekly installments and
an interest rate of 6% per month calculated on a declining balance basis. This makes the loan affordable—a typical family
pays about $80 per month for the loan. In addition, FINCOMUN estimates that 10% to 15% of the enterprise credit is
diverted, in part, to cover home improvements related to business operations.
FINCOMUN, the only Mexican MFI that has chosen to
enter the housing improvement field to date, seems well positioned to expand into this market—it is operationally and
financially sustainable, it is supervised and therefore less risky
than other MFIs, it provides larger loans than most Mexican
MFIs, and it has a clear commercial orientation underlying its
operations. However, scaling up its portfolio in this field represents a major challenge for FINCOMUN, because it does not
have a capillary branch structure and lacks market information
and expertise in the housing filed.
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Catalytic Role of Governments and Donors
This paper has shown that (1) there is enormous demand for
commercially priced microfinance and housing microfinance
loans in Mexico, (2) housing microfinance is more closely
related to microenterprise than to mortgage finance, (3) some
profitable products have been developed by Latin American
microfinance institutions that offer important lessons (albeit at
a relatively small scale), and (4) there are a few innovative
efforts in Mexico upon which to build.
The final challenge is to determine how the government,
with donor support, can serve as a short-term catalyst for
market expansion until a convincing financial argument can be
demonstrated to large-scale private sector investors and financial institutions, such as commercial banks. Well-designed
government and donor financial and technical assistance inputs
and incentives could help the Mexican MFIs to develop housing microfinance products. These interventions include the
following:
1. Supporting market studies and pilot initiatives
2. Providing incentives to help institutions involved in this
field to scale up their portfolios, or help to newcomers add
a housing microfinance loan to their product line
3. Providing innovative sources of funds for housing microfinance
4. Encouraging franchising, joint ventures, and exchanges
1. Supporting market studies and pilot initiatives.
Government and donors could provide short-term subsidies to
MFIs and other financial institutions to support market
research in large underserved markets (such as Mexico City and
the northern and southern states) and disseminate pilot results
widely. In addition, they could create a technical assistance
facility to support pilots, in order to help MFIs and other
financial institutions better understand the risks and dynamics
of microfinance housing, as well as possible complementarities
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between housing microfinance and existing microfinance loan
products.
2. Providing incentives. Large financial institutions that
have pilots in housing microfinance, such as Caja Popular
Mexicana (with its extensive branch network and hundreds of
thousands of clients), require technical assistance to help management assess this potential product line. Since CPM’s portfolio is not performing well, additional technical assistance in
delinquency management would be useful. Since CPM and
other large financial institutions have ready access to large
pools of savings, they do not require access to credit lines.
For small MFIs with an existing, effective product (such as
FUNHAVI and FINCOMUN), access to affordable lines of
credit is the main constraint to expansion. These MFIs can
only attract limited grants and investors, so they must turn to
other financial institutions as a source of funds. (See point
3 below for a discussion of this point.)
In addition, government and donors could consider providing incentives to home improvement chain stores to add
housing microfinance to their consumer credit lines. Home
Depot and other chains have a significant retail network on
which to build, both in Mexico and in other Latin American
countries. Housing improvement loans might prove to be a
natural progression for such home improvement chains.
3. Providing innovative sources of funds. Without reliable
and streamlined access to commercially priced funds, MFIs are
unable to expand into housing microfinance in a significant
way. Since the maturity of a housing loan is often two to three
years, the maturity of the source funds has to be longer than
those provided for working capital portfolios that are quickly
turned over, which are typical of the Mexican MFIs. Good
performance (measured by portfolio quality and administrative
efficiency) could be used to qualify MFIs for access to large,
commercially priced, performance-tracked credit lines for
housing microfinance. In Mexico and much of Latin America,
it is clear that the financial markets will not provide adequate
Volume 5 Number 1
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funding to address this opportunity, at least until there is
stronger evidence of the commercial viability of MFIs and
their housing portfolios.
Other channels should be developed that are commercially
oriented and apolitical; these could be complemented by time
bound incentives for housing microfinance experimentation
and MFI institutional strengthening. FOVI has a program that
channels credit to limited purpose finance companies to provide credit for new housing unit construction. However, the
finance company (SOFOL) must identify a large construction
company, usually for a financing package of 500 units in various apartment buildings. Eligible clients receive subsidized
credit for 10 to 20 years and may also qualify for a grant for the
down payment.
The FOVI program is not the ideal form of financing for
millions of clients because it does not include the progressive
housing market. It could, however, be the basis of a similar
program for that specific market, or a specialized window
could be developed to promote progressive housing.
4. Encouraging franchising, joint ventures, and exchanges.
Innovative MFIs with significant housing microfinance portfolios (such as FUNHAVI) could be assisted in efforts to find
sound partners and expand to very large markets such as
Mexico City. Funding for dissemination activities, exchanges
(within Mexico and to successful programs elsewhere in Latin
America) could also have a high return in terms of rapid development of locally adapted products and delivery models. Joint
ventures between institutions with technical skills and specific
experience in the housing field, as well as sound institutions
with a decentralized organization, would facilitate scaling up
coverage of the housing improvement market in an efficient,
capillary, and fast way.
Applying the criteria mentioned above, which h
ave been used in the past to expand the coverage of working
capital microfinance in other settings, would go a long
way toward helping the private sector (MFIs, institutions
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specialized in housing, home improvement chains, and other
private organizations) to address the needs of the millions
of potential clients in Mexico awaiting access to housing
microfinance.

Notes
This paper was prepared as input for the World Bank study Mexico Low
Income Housing: Issues and Options. The study was financed and prepared
under the overall supervision of the World Bank Mexico Country Unit and the
Urban Cluster of the Finance and Infrastructure Department of the Latin
American Region. The authors would like to thank Olivier Lafourcade, Country
Director of the Mexico country unit; Mila Freire and Anna Wellenstein, coordinators of the study; and the people who provided information that made the
preparation of this paper possible: Adela de Rizzo and Wagner Kurup from
Genesis Empresarial, Eric Adams from FUNHAVI, Marco Avina Bueno from
Caja Popular Mexicana, and Vicente Fenoll from FINCOMUN. The views
included in the paper are those of the authors only and should not be attributed
to the World Bank, any other affiliate organizations, or the institutions interviewed in the course of the study. Nor do any of the conclusions represent
official policy of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they
represent.
1. In East Africa, the rate of client dropout ranges between 25 and 60% per
annum. In Uganda, the norm is 25% or more. In Bangladesh, dropouts vary
between 10 and 15%. While the reasons for desertion are multidimensional, “dissatisfaction with the characteristics of the current products” is the main one
quoted consistently by interviewees across countries and institutions (Wright,
2001; Wilson, 2001).
2. This is due to two main causes. First, government programs do not allow
borrowers to take on follow-up loans, thus discouraging them from paying the
first loan back. Second, government loans’ very low interest rates lead the borrowers to regard these credits as endowments.
3. “Credit from friends and relatives mainly takes the form of unpaid labor,
assuming that the borrower will also be available to lend a hand in the house
building or house improvement efforts of the people who have helped him. Apart
from the provision of labor, it is also common for monetary support to be given
to a relative or a good friend who is improving or extending a house. Whether,
and to what extent, interest is charged on these loans, depends on the closeness of
the family ties in each case” (World Bank, 1997). For a more complete list of
households’ possible informal financial sources, see Ferguson (1999), p. 189.
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4. According to a recent study conducted by SEDESOL for the World Bank,
6.2 million Mexican houses (equal to 27.5 percent of the 2000 housing stock)
need improvements (World Bank, 2002). Inconsistencies among the figures of
different studies are mainly due to the differing definitions of “housing improvement” adopted by the various authors.
5. Multicredit Bank (Panama) and Mutual La Primera (Bolivia) are among the
few examples of Latin American banks that offer microfinance housing loans.
The Hatton National Bank is an interesting case: a Sri Lanka commercial bank
that has decided to “go downscale” and offer microfinance services (Gallardo,
Randhawa, & Sacay, 1997). For a complete list of commercial banks that are providing microfinance productive loans to micro and small businesses and that
could potentially enter the housing microfinance sector, see Wenner & Campos
(1998). Limited-purpose mortgage banks (SOFOLES in Latin America) are
another source of housing credit in the commercial banking sector. They usually
lend to developers during the building stage and then transfer the loans to homebuyers when the purchase takes place (Ferguson & Heider, 2000). Credit unions
may also offer housing improvement loans. They have legal and capital requirements that are more flexible than are those of banks, and they can accept
deposits and originate various types of loans. However, they have little experience in the housing field and, like commercial banks, are likely to have little
interest in adding this line of credit to their portfolio.
6. This is often used as a proxy for the client’s poverty level.
7. Historically, the Microbanking Bulletin has used a 90% ratio rather than a
100% ratio to take into account the fact that the adjustment process (i.e., the calculation of the FFS index) may not be exact. As the numbers of FSS MFIs continue to grow, the Bulletin has raised the bar on performance standards to 99.5%
which still leaves a small cushion for the adjustment judgment call (Churchill,
2001).
8. For more on Compartamos, see Bulletin case study on compartamos
(1999), pp. 13–17.
9. Sources for the information included in this section are E. Adams from
the Community Housing Foundation (CHF), personal communication; and
Community Housing Foundation (1997).
10. Source for the information included in this section is M. Avina Bueno,
Caja Popular Mexicana Vice Director of Planning and Organization, personal
communication.
11. Source for the information included in this section is V. Fenoll, FINCOMUN Executive Director, personal communication.
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